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Abstract
Werner Heisenberg’s 1925 paper “Quantum-theoretical re-interpretation
of kinematic and mechanical relations” marks the beginning of quantum
mechanics. Heisenberg famously claims that the paper is based on the idea
that the new quantum mechanics should be “founded exclusively upon
relationships between quantities which in principle are observable”. My
paper is an attempt to understand this observability principle, and to see
whether its employment is philosophically defensible. Against interpreta-
tions of ‘observability’ along empiricist or positivist lines I argue that such
readings are philosophically unsatisfying. Moreover, a careful comparison
of Heisenberg’s reinterpretation of classical kinematics with Einstein’s ar-
gument against absolute simultaneity reveals that the positivist reading
does not fit with Heisenberg’s strategy in the paper. Instead the complain
that electron orbits are unobservable should be understood as a criticism
of the causal inefficacy of orbital electron motion in Bohr’s atomic model.
I conclude that the tacit philosophical principle behind Heisenberg’s argu-
ment is not a positivistic connection between observability and meaning,
but the idea that a theory should not contain causally idle wheels.
Keywords: quantum mechanics; Heisenberg; observability; positivism; Einstein.
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1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics was invented in the short period between 1925 and 1927.
A pivotal contribution was made by the young Werner Heisenberg, in his cel-
ebrated 1925 paper “U¨ber quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und
mechanischer Beziehungen”[Heisenberg, 1925], which is usually taken to be the
starting point of matrix mechanics. Famously, Heisenberg begins this paper
proposing that the new quantum mechanics must be based only on relations
between quantities that are in principle observable.
In the eyes of some of his colleagues at Go¨ttingen, it was invoking this princi-
ple of observability, which allowed Heisenberg to make a crucial breakthrough,
and which led to the development of quantum mechanics [Born, 1955]. By
contrast, some of Heisenberg’s contemporaries, notably Einstein, rejected the
principle as misguided.1 These different assessments raise the question what
role the principle of observability played for Heisenberg’s argument, and what
Heisenberg meant by ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ in the first place.
Two natural readings are to understand ‘observable’ either as what can be
perceived or as what can be measured. On the first reading one might then
attempt to defend the idea that only observable quantities should be admitted
into physical theories on general empiricist grounds: we have better epistemic
access to what can be perceived, and hence we should avoid including anything
which cannot be perceived into our theories. On the second reading one might
be tempted to connect measurability to meaning in what might be called a pos-
itivistic2 manner: terms referring to quantities which are not measurable are
(physically) meaningless, and hence should not be employed in theory construc-
tion.
The positivistic reading of Heisenberg’s principle has seemed especially plau-
sible in light of the then widespread positivist reading of Einstein’s argument
against absolute simultaneity in 1905, and the apparent commitment to posi-
tivist ideas of several of Heisenberg’s close collaborators, as we will see in more
detail in section three. Justifying the appeal to observables on either empiri-
cist or positivistic grounds yields no philosophically satisfactory argument for
Heisenberg’s purposes, as will become clear in section four. It would seem then,
that Heisenberg’s paper does not succeed because of its appeal to observability,
but in spite of it. Accordingly many recent interpretations try to save Heisen-
berg from embarrassment and view the appeal to observability as an ad hoc
addition to the paper rather than as a guiding principle (e.g. Beller [1999] and
Camilleri [2009]).
While I concede that observability may have played a less central role in
Heisenberg’s development of the mathematical techniques of the paper, it seems
that declaring the principle to be ad hoc fails to explain the prominent role
given to it in Heisenberg’s presentation, and more importantly, it leaves Heisen-
1As Heisenberg vividly recalls in his autobiography 1969.
2‘Positivistic’ because of the emphasis the logical positivists put on the connection between
empirical verifiability and meaning, not because all of the physicists who suggested principles
along these lines were in fact positivists.
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berg’s paper somewhat unmotivated. Heisenberg appears as the lucky kid who
stumbled upon the key to solving the quantum puzzle, but why his approach
succeeded remains unclear. In order to give an account of Heisenberg’s success,
we need to understand the role the observability principle was supposed to play
in Heisenberg’s argument. I argue that observability understood positivistically
fails to do justice to the task, but that a principle like observability is nonetheless
needed for Heisenberg’s argument.
Through a careful reconsideration of the comparison of Einstein’s and Heisen-
berg’s way of reinterpreting classical kinematics I show in section five that unlike
Einstein, Heisenberg makes no attempt to give a new empirical definition of his
reinterpreted kinematic concepts. Instead his reinterpretation is purely math-
ematical. This suggests that the positivist reading of Heisenberg’s project is
not only unsatisfactory philosophically, but also unilluminating with regard to
Heisenberg’s actual strategy in the paper, which opens up the possibility of sep-
arating Heisenberg’s appeal to observability from the positivistic interpretation
of the principle.
In the final section of the paper I offer an alternative reconstruction of
Heisenberg’s argument as an objection to the introduction of causally idle wheels
in Bohr’s atomic theory. I show that while rejecting electron orbits and their
properties on the basis of unobservability alone remains unsatisfactory, rejecting
them as causally idle wheels is plausible. This allows us to acknowledge the im-
portance of a principle playing the role the observability principle is supposed
to play, without being forced to attribute to Heisenberg a dodgy positivistic
argument.
2 Heisenberg’s 1925 paper
Heisenberg’s Umdeutung paper is justly regarded as the beginning of quan-
tum mechanics proper. In his paper Heisenberg formulates the basis for what
would soon become known as ‘matrix mechanics’ by replacing classical kine-
matic quantities like motion, understood as position as a function of time, by
quantum theoretical representatives. Based on this replacement he uses clas-
sical equations of motion to describe the behavior of a simple model system:
the one-dimensional anharmonic oscillator. In the course of his replacement of
classical kinematic quantities, Heisenberg arrives at what would soon become
a central principle of quantum mechanics: the non-commutativity of factors
in the multiplication of certain quantum mechanical quantities. This multi-
plication rule, which Heisenberg initially regarded as a difficulty, led Born to
interpret Heisenberg’s calculations in terms of matrices.3
In the abstract to his paper, Heisenberg puts forward, as the organizing
principle of his approach, what I will call Heisenberg’s observability principle:
“The present paper seeks to establish a basis for theoretical quantum mechanics
founded exclusively upon relationships between quantities which in principle are
3See Mehra and Rechenberg [1982b] for a detailed discussion of the different aspects of the
paper and its context.
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observable” [Heisenberg, 1925, 879].4 In this section I will briefly show where
Heisenberg appeals to this principle in his argument, and why this appeal has
often seemed problematic.5
The first and by far most prominent appeal to observability occurs in the
lengthy introduction of Heisenberg’s paper, where he seems to use the principle
to criticize the old quantum theory, i.e., the Bohr model of atomic structure.
“It is well known that the formal rules which are used in quantum theory for
calculating observable quantities such as the energy of the hydrogen atom may
be seriously criticized on the grounds that they contain, as basic element, rela-
tionships between quantities that are apparently unobservable in principle, e.g.,
position and period of the revolution of the electron” [Heisenberg, 1925, 879].
Here we get a first indication of the quantities Heisenberg rejects as unobserv-
able, namely quantities associated with electron orbits in Bohr’s model, and of
those he counts as observable, namely the energy of the hydrogen atom.
The reason Heisenberg offers for doubting that the former quantities will be-
come observable later on is that the old quantum theory is beset with empirical
problems and limited in scope.6 In light of these difficulties he suggests that
the empirical successes of the old quantum theory7 are merely “fortuitous” and
proposes “to try to establish a theoretical quantum mechanics, analogous to
classical mechanics, but in which only relations between observable quantities
occur”[Heisenberg, 1925, 880]. Heisenberg hence seems to appeal to observabil-
ity both to criticize the old quantum theory, and to motivate his own novel
approach.
That there were severe problems with the old quantum theory was widely
acknowledged by 1925, so Heisenberg’s extended criticism in the introduction is
somewhat puzzling, unless we assume he is trying to establish the importance of
the observability principle. The trouble is that this principle does not seem to
contribute much to the overall argument, since the criticism of the old quantum
theory rests ultimately on the empirical problems of the theory, not on the
unobservability of the quantities in question. In fact, if anything the argument
seems to go the other way around: the reason we should give up hope that
the quantities will eventually become observable is precisely that the theory in
which they occur is unpromising.8
Even if the appeal to observability does not seem essential to the criticism of
the old quantum theory, it might still be used to motivate Heisenberg’s replace-
4I am largely following the translation [Heisenberg, 1967] in van der Waerden 1967, except
where indicated otherwise.
5I will only be concerned with Heisenberg’s paper insofar as it is relevant to the under-
standing of the observability principle. For an excellent presentation of the model-based
reasoning process Heisenberg may have gone through, see [MacKinnon, 1977]; for a technical
reconstruction of Heisenberg’s calculation see [Aitchison et al., 2004].
6Heisenberg lists in particular the problem of crossed fields and the inability to extend the
quantum rules to atoms with more than one electron.
7What he presumably has in mind is the successful analysis of the hydrogen atom.
8“This hope [to observe the quantities later] might be regarded as justified if the above-
mentioned rules were internally consistent and applicable to a clearly defined range of quantum
mechanical problems” [Heisenberg, 1925, 880].
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ment of kinematic quantities like motion, x(t). In quantum theory we cannot
“associate the electron with a point in space, considered as a function of time,
by the means of observable quantities”[Heisenberg, 1925, 881]; what we can
do instead, however, is attribute emitted radiation to it. Heisenberg justifies
the crucial step of using quantities associated with emitted radiation instead of
classical kinematic quantities by appeal to the principle of using only observ-
able quantities. The need to find a quantum theoretical representative for x(t)
arises only when we accept that being unable to assign position as a function of
time on the basis of observable quantities constitutes a problem, and the only
reason we seem to have for thinking that this is a problem is the principle of
observability. Since this replacement is a crucial step in the paper, the principle
of observability would seem to have a central role in Heisenberg’s argument.
Despite this apparently crucial function of observability in justifying Heisen-
berg’s own proposal, it has often been suggested that observability is not the
motivation for Heisenberg’s argument. Instead it seems that for much of the
positive part of the paper it is the correspondence principle9 which drives the
argument, even though Heisenberg seems reluctant to acknowledge its use.10
It is indeed plausible to suggest that Heisenberg was familiar with the par-
ticular techniques he employed in his reinterpretation from work he had done
with Kramers in Copenhagen,11 and accordingly that those techniques were not
exclusively motivated by the observability principle, but instead made heavy use
of the correspondence principle. To pitch the observability principle against the
correspondence principle, however, looks like a false dilemma. Even if Heisen-
berg’s overall approach was shaped by the correspondence principle, this does
not mean that the principle of observability did not have a key justificatory
role to play in the argument. Without denying the importance of those other
motivations and influences for Heisenberg’s actual reasoning process, it seems
to me that Heisenberg did feel a genuine unease about the use of electron or-
bits and their properties in the old quantum theory, and that he expressed this
discomfort by describing these orbits as ‘unobservable’.
Hints for this can be found in Heisenberg’s letter to Wolfgang Pauli from July
9th 1925, which enclosed the Umdeutung manuscript: “all my own paltry efforts
are aimed at killing completely the concept of orbits, which are not observable
anyway, and to replace it suitably”.12 The role of the observability principle,
for Heisenberg, is to justify the elimination of the concept of electron orbits
9The exact interpretation of Bohr’s correspondence principle is subject to much debate;
for a recent survey of options see Bokulich [2010]. The use of the correspondence principle
in the physics community seems to have been to start from relationships between classical
quantities and to use them ‘to guess’ which ‘corresponding’ quantum relationships might
hold among them. For a discussion of how Heisenberg’s thinking about the correspondence
principle evolved, see [Mehra and Rechenberg, 1982b].
10Beller [1999] speculates that Heisenberg may have been reluctant to emphasize his reliance
on the correspondence principle because of its extensive use in the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory,
which had just been experimentally refuted.
11See Mehra and Rechenberg [1982b] for discussion.
12The German reads:“meine ganzen ku¨mmerlichen Bemu¨hungen gehen dahin, den Begriff
der Bahnen, die man doch nicht beobachten kann, restlos umzubringen und geeignet zu erset-
zen” [Pauli, 1979, 231; my translation].
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altogether, because Heisenberg suspects that electron orbits do not exist. The
correspondence principle, as we shall see in more detail in section five, helped
Heisenberg to find a suitable replacement, but that alone does not suffice to
get rid of electron orbits. For that Heisenberg needs a reason to think that
they have a feature that makes them unsuitable for physical theorizing, and he
needs a philosophical principle to justify why having that feature makes them
ineligible for physical theories. If this is the role of the observability principle,
is observability the right principle to use? I will show first what observability
might mean in the context of Heisenbergs paper, then I will show that the
principle so understood does not work and does not reflect Heisenbergs strategy
in the paper, and finally I propose a related, but different principle, which can
play the required role, and which picks out the feature Heisenberg perhaps really
thought made electron orbits suspect: they are causally idle wheels.
3 Two readings of observability
The idea that observability matters for science is not unique to Heisenberg. In
this section we shall look at two interpretations of observability and observ-
ability principles, which can be found in discussions of physics prior to Heisen-
berg. Since at least the second of these principles was employed by friends of
Heisenberg, it seems like a prima facie plausible candidate for understanding
Heisenberg’s own principle.
A traditional empiricist13 understanding of observability is perceptibility :
only what can be perceived by the unaided senses is observable, everything else
is unobservable. This conception of observability has certain advantages with
respect to Heisenberg’s argument. The position and period of revolution of an
electron inside the atom are indeed not perceptible, and, more importantly, it
is plausible to suggest that they will remain imperceptible. What is perceptible
and what is not depends on our sensory organs and not on technical advances,
and unlike technology, our sense organs change very slowly at best. It makes
sense, then, to say that quantities like the position of an electron in an atom
‘unobservable in principle’.
If we understand unobservable to mean imperceptible, Heisenberg’s princi-
ple means that only relations among perceptible quantities may be admitted.
It is difficult to see how such a principle could be defended, even from an em-
piricist point of view.14 Indeed, the quantities Heisenberg himself offers up as
observable, like energy, are themselves not perceptible. Even the line spectra of
atoms are only partly perceptible, since they extend beyond the visible realm.
13Heisenberg might have been familiar with this understanding of observability from the
work of Ernst Mach, although in Heisenberg’s recollection Mach had no decisive impact on
his thinking [Kuhn et al., 1967, Session 1, 3-4].
14The limited force of this empiricist distinction is underscored by the fact that Bas van
Fraassen, the most prominent contemporary defender of a distinction roughly along the lines
sketched above, does not try to draw any ontological conclusions from this distinction, nor
does he suggest that science should never involve reference to unobservables; instead he offers
only an epistemological recommendation for the rest of us [van Fraassen, 1980].
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So it seems unlikely that Heisenberg’s argument is going to succeed if ‘observ-
able’ is taken to mean perceptible, even if a full-blown empiricist defense of the
distinction and the restriction to perceptibles could be given.
A more likely source for Heisenberg’s principle is Pauli’s criticism of Hermann
Weyl’s unified field theory of 1918 [Weyl, 1920]. Pauli’s objection concerned
Weyl’s use of the idea of an electric field inside the electron. As Pauli pointed
out, “[f]or a physicist this [the field strength] is only defined as a force on a
test-body, and since there are no smaller test-bodies than the electron itself,
the concept of the electric field strength in a mathematical point seems to be
an empty, meaningless fiction. One would like to hold on to the idea that only
quantities observable in principle should be introduced into physics.” [Pauli,
1919].
Pauli’s objection to Weyl depends on a different reading of ‘observable’ from
the one discussed above, since the electric field strength even outside the electron
is not observable in the sense of being accessible to sense perception. Instead
Pauli’s notion of ‘observability’ has to do with measurement : what is measurable
is observable, whether or not it is something we can see. The electric field inside
the electron is unobservable in principle, in the sense of being unmeasurable in
principle, because the one measurement procedure we have is systematically
inapplicable due to the lack of an appropriate test-body.
Pauli does not offer any explicit reasons why introducing such in principle
unmeasurable quantities into physical theories is problematic, but such reasons
are easy to give on his behalf: unmeasurable quantities threaten the testability
of the theory. If a theory stipulates that a certain relationship holds between
several quantities, or that changes in a particular quantity are responsible for
certain phenomena, then it is desirable to have some measurement procedure,
direct or indirect, of that quantity in order to be able to generate specific pre-
dictions and to test them. If there are reasons to believe, not only that such
measurements are unavailable, but that they are impossible, then this counts
against the theory in question. It is not my concern here to evaluate whether
this is in fact true for the debate between Weyl and Pauli, but we shall look
carefully at whether Heisenberg might have objected to the old quantum theory
on these grounds in the next section.
There is, however, another aspect to Pauli’s objection, which seems to make
his rejection of unobservable quantities more radical. When he calls the electric
field inside the electron an “empty, meaningless fiction”, he seems to suggest
that a term referring to a quantity which cannot be measured is therefore mean-
ingless, thereby connecting the measurability of quantities and testability of
theories on the one hand with meaningfulness of terms occurring in the theory
on the other. This sort of connection was of course defended by logical posi-
tivists, and it is natural to assume that at least one source for both Pauli and
the positivists was Einstein’s work on special relativity [1905]. According to this
positivistic reading (e.g. Bridgman [1927], Reichenbach [1949]), Einstein’s key
insight in the 1905 paper had been that absolute simultaneity lacks ‘physical
meaning’, precisely because it was not possible to give a measurement procedure
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for it even in a thought experiment.15
Much later, in his nobel lecture in 1954, Max Born would draw a direct com-
parison between Einstein’s argument and Heisenberg’s principle: “The principle
states that concepts and representations that do not correspond to physically
observable facts are not to be used in theoretical description. Einstein used
the same principle when, in setting up his theory of relativity, he eliminated
the concepts of absolute velocity of a body and of absolute simultaneity of two
events at different places. Heisenberg banished the picture of electron orbits
with definite radii and periods of rotation because these quantities are not ob-
servable [. . . ]” [Born, 1955, 258-9]. Born here draws a direct connection not
only between Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s arguments, but between the use of
observability principles understood along positivistic lines in those arguments.
A natural reading of Heisenberg’s observability principle, then, is to take ‘ob-
servable’ to mean measurable, and to take the requirement of measurability to
stem from an alleged connection between meaning and measurability.
4 Problems with the measurability reading
There are good reasons why the positivist reading of Heisenberg’s argument
seems appropriate. As we’ve seen in the previous section, this viewpoint was
used by Pauli in his objection against Weyl. Heisenberg closely exchanged views
and opinions with Pauli during much of his career, and he had talked with Pauli
about the problem of electron orbits.16 Moreover, shortly after the publication
of Umdeutung, in the defense of matrix mechanics against Schro¨dinger’s com-
peting wave-mechanics, Heisenberg seems to develop more explicitly positivistic
views, culminating in his 1927 paper on the uncertainty principle.17 Nonethe-
less I will argue that observability understood as measurability does not suffice
for role the observability principle is supposed to play in Heisenberg’s argu-
ment. Observability understood as measurability cannot justify the elimination
of electron orbits from the theory.
There are two general problems with understanding observability as measur-
ability. First, it is somewhat ambiguous whether it is required that an actual
measurement procedure is carried out, or whether it is enough to describe a pos-
sible procedure for carrying out such a measurement, even if actually carrying
out this procedure is not currently feasible.
If the former, what is observable at any given moment is restricted primarily
by the technology available, which does not seem to be the kind of restriction
on which to build a strong ontological argument. Technology is likely to extend
our reach, and so any distinction drawn between what is measurable and what is
not would seem to be more an indication of our historically indexed limitations,
and less an indication of a deep ontological difference among the entities which
can currently be measured and those which cannot. Recall, though, that, for the
15I will come back to Einstein’s argument in more detail below.
16See Kuhn et al. [1967, Session 5 p. 20]
17See Camilleri [2009] for a more nuanced view of the role of operationalism in that paper.
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argument in the paper, Heisenberg needs a principle which would allow him to
conclude that electron orbits do not exist. There is no reason to ‘kill’ a concept
when there is still hope it might soon apply to something measurable.
If the latter, on the other hand, the distinction does seem conceptual rather
than practical, and so perhaps more suited as the basis of a philosophical ar-
gument. It also means, however, that it is more difficult to show that a given
quantity fails to be observable on this standard. In particular, the quantities
rejected by Heisenberg—the position and period of revolution of the electron
inside the atom—might well turn out to be observable in this case, since it
does seem possible to come up with a procedure which would determine them,
even though the procedure can currently not be carried out. As suggested by
Burkhard Drude,18 one might construct a gamma ray microscope, which would
allow for radiation with sufficiently small wavelength to locate the electron in-
side the atom. Moreover, while nobody could claim to have measured the orbit
of an electron inside the atom, there was good experimental evidence that elec-
trons moved particle-like on trajectories outside of atoms: the tracks in Wilson
cloud chambers. Accordingly, if all that is needed for electron orbits to count
as observable would be for us to imagine extending our current measurement
procedures, electron orbits seem likely to be observable.
Whether we take observability to require that something can be measured
right now, or whether we are satisfied with the description of a measurement
procedure in principle, it is not going to be enough to eliminate position and
period of revolution of the electron.
The second problem with understanding ‘observable’ as measurable was
forcefully made by Einstein in a conversation with Heisenberg. There Einstein
argued against Heisenberg’s employment of observability, that what is observ-
able depends on the theory, and is not something which can be antecedently
decided, as a means of motivating and developing the theory. It is easy to read
this just along the lines of a general ‘holism’, according to which all observation
is theory-laden and we have to give up the observable/unobservable distinction
altogether. But there is a more specific, and perhaps more plausible reading of
Einstein’s objection, on which a theory determines what is observable through
indirect measurement.19
One of the things our theories do is to offer up putative laws connecting
directly measurable quantities to quantities not directly accessible in the hope
of using the former quantity to measure the latter. Our ability to measure
quantities thereby improves not just as our technology improves, but also as
our theory advances. Einstein objects that quantum theory is not yet in a con-
dition which allows a judgment about which quantities will ultimately become
accessible through measurement, and given the dependence of what is measur-
able on the development of our theories, observability principles understood as
measurability principles can never be used to determine the structure of the
theory antecedently. In light of the fact that Heisenberg and many of his con-
18See Heisenberg [1969, 112] as well as Kuhn et al. [1967, Session 7, 26].
19See also Camilleri [2009] for further defense of this reading.
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temporaries had taken Einstein’s own argument against absolute simultaneity
to proceed from an observability principle, Einstein’s objection to the principle
seems especially significant, a point to which I will return in the next section.
If we understand Heisenberg’s notion of observability as measurability, Heisen-
berg’s argument is fundamentally flawed. What is measurable depends in no
small part on us, on our theories and (technological) practices, and accordingly it
would seem highly anthropocentric to assume that what is outside our epistemic
reach does not exist. One might nonetheless attempt to strengthen the princi-
ple positivistically by suggesting that what is outside our (empirical) epistemic
reach is not well understood, and it is really this lack of proper understanding
which casts suspicion on the concepts involved. Indeed such a move might seem
natural as a reading of Heisenberg’s principle in light of the influence Pauli and
Born had on his thinking and in light of the fact that he called his paper a
‘reinterpretation’ of classical kinematics. As I will show in the next section,
however, this positivistic reading of the reinterpretation project in Heisenberg’s
paper is implausible.
5 Rethinking the analogy with Einstein
The positivistic reading had seemed plausible in no small part because of the
widespread positivistic reading of Einstein’s rejection of absolute simultaneity.
In Born’s understanding, the comparison with Einstein concerned the principle
both Einstein and Heisenberg were thought to have employed: the observability
principle.
There are other respects in which Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s paper might
be compared as well. Mehra and Rechenberg [1982b, 303-304] list a number
of similarities between the two papers: both Einstein and Heisenberg achieve a
breakthrough by reformulating kinematics, they both base their papers on a few
principles, and they end up with a surprising mathematical relation (Einstein
with the addition law for light velocities, Heisenberg with the multiplication
rule). Finally, the new theories approximate the classical ones in the limit, and
each theory involves a new fundamental constant (c and h respectively).
In light of these numerous similarities, and the fact that Heisenberg seems to
have regarded Einstein’s way of doing physics as paradigmatic,20 we should not
conclude that Heisenberg did not intend his paper in analogy with Einstein’s.
Instead of trying to compare the alleged or actual principles at work in the
two papers directly, perhaps a better starting point is provided by the task
undertaken in the two papers: a reinterpretation of kinematics. This seems
especially appropriate given that it is the explicit topic of Heisenberg’s paper,
as the title suggest. What is being redefined or reinterpreted in Einstein’s and
Heisenberg’s papers, and how does the redefinition proceed?
In Einstein’s case the redefinition concerns motion insofar as motion takes
place in time. Mechanics describes motion mathematically by giving position
20“I was impressed by Einstein’s way of doing things, but not by Mach’s.” [Kuhn et al.,
1967, Session 1, 3-4].
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as a function of time, but such a mathematical description only has “physical
meaning” (“physikalischen Sinn”), once we understand what is meant by “time”
[Einstein, 1905, 892]. For Einstein, then, the problem of redefinition concerns
the problem of giving physical meaning to a mathematical description, and the
concept in need of physical meaning is the concept of time. It quickly emerges,
of course, that the real problem concerns not time but simultaneity in different
locations, resulting in Einstein’s famous observation that the definition of time
depends on the notion of a system at rest, from which, together with the light
principle, it follows in turn that we cannot think of simultaneity as being defined
absolutely.
In giving his definitions Einstein proceeds by providing “imaginary phys-
ical experiments”,21 which reveal the assumptions involved in making claims
about simultaneous events at distant locations. Giving physical meaning to
a mathematical description involves the description of experiments, or better,
measurement procedures, which seems to support a positivist reading of the ar-
gument. The positivist reading assumed that Einstein’s key innovation was to
demand this kind of physical meaning in the first place, and that conversely, a
physical meaning along these lines had been absent from Newtonian mechanics.
On this reading, absolute time and simultaneity lack physical meaning because
no measurement procedure can be described for them, which makes them, in
one sense, unobservable. Understood this way, Einstein’s argument does involve
a ‘principle of observability’: only observable quantities may be admitted into
the theory.
This reading, however, rests on a misunderstanding. As Robert DiSalle
[2008] has argued, the problem was not that simultaneity lacked an empirical
definition along the lines given by Einstein, but that its empirical definition
assumed that Newton’s velocity addition law would hold for light also, and that
light could accordingly be treated as a proxy measure for an instantaneous sig-
nal. Use of an instantaneous signal would of course permit the synchronization
of clocks across spatial distances, and thereby allow for an empirical definition
of absolute simultaneity. Electromagnetism reveals that this treatment of light
is impermissible: light travels at a fixed velocity which cannot be increased by
emitting it from a moving body, and therefore instantaneous signaling cannot be
approximated using light. Einstein’s empirical definition of simultaneity must
therefore be understood as redefinition in response to the fact that empirical
assumptions made by the previous definition turned out to be false.
Heisenberg’s redefinition also concerns kinematical quantities, and it is self-
consciously a reinterpretation (“Umdeutung”).22 Like in Einstein’s case the
quantity to be redefined appears to be motion, or position as a function of time
x(t). But here the papers diverge. Heisenberg’s worry does not concern time,
but the possibility of assigning a position as a function of time to an electron.
Such an assignment, Heisenberg claims, is not possible on the basis of observable
21I follow the translation in [Einstein, 1952]; the German is “gedachte physikalische Er-
fahrungen” [1905, 892].
22Darrigol [1992, 274] also emphasizes the importance of “Umdeutung” in the title, tracing
it back to Arnold Sommerfeld’s use of the term [1922].
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quantities, which makes position an ineligible quantity by the standards of the
observability principle.
Appeal to observability might suggest an attempted positivistic move, per-
haps based on the positivist reading of Einstein’s argument above: x(t) for
electrons needs to be redefined, because in the absence of a link with observable
quantities, the quantity x(t) lacks physical meaning. If this was the intent, we
should expect Heisenberg to follow up by offering physical thought experiments
providing an empirical definition of electron motion in quantum mechanics.
What follows, however, is nothing of the sort.
Instead of an empirical redefinition by means of thought experiments, Heisen-
berg offers a mathematical redefinition using the correspondence principle, specif-
ically appealing to the correspondence between the quantities associated with
the emitted radiation (i.e. frequencies and amplitudes) and the harmonics of pe-
riodic motion in classical mechanics.23 The quantum theoretical representative
for the quantity x(t), Heisenberg suggests, should be the ensemble of quanti-
ties A(n, n − α)eiω(n,n−α)t.24 This ensemble consists of transition amplitudes
and phases, which unlike their classical counterparts depend on two ‘stationary
states’ n and n−α. Because of this dependence on two states it is not possible
to represent
x(n, t) =
+∞∑
−∞
αAα(n)e
iω(n).αt
as one would for periodic motion in the classical case.
Representing x(t) as A(n, n−α)eiω(n,n−α)t instead, Heisenberg is faced with
a new problem: the phase eiω(n,n−α)t is complex, thereby raising a question
about the “physical meaning” [Heisenberg, 1925, 882] both of the phase and the
amplitude containing it. Heisenberg solves this problem by devising a rule to
arrive at the quantum representative for the squared quantity [x(t)]2, which will
be real instead of complex. Since the individual (complex) phases still contribute
to the resulting quantity, Heisenberg concludes that the phases have physical
significance even in quantum theory.25 However, as Heisenberg remarks, “a ge-
ometrical interpretation of such quantum-theoretical phase relations in analogy
with classical theory initially seems hardly possible” [Heisenberg, 1925, 883].
If we follow Heisenberg’s Umdeutung of kinematics, motion in quantum me-
chanics cannot be understood as a change of position over time, but at least in
23Darrigol [1992, 275] points out, rightly, that the correspondence principle played hence
a central role in Heisenberg’s derivation, but follows others in concluding that this therefore
limits the role the observability principle played in the paper. But there seems to be no
particular reason to think that the correspondence principle and the observability principle
are in competition.
24In Heisenberg’s own recollection of how he arrived at this representation of x(t) he freely
admits that the details of how this representation should pan out or why it should work were
quite vague: “Well, it [x(t)] means certainly some kind of radiation, so all these frequencies
which are possibly emitted do somehow represent this X(t). “Somehow represents” was, of
course, a very vague term but it wasn’t more than that.” [Kuhn et al., 1967, Session 7, 9]
25It is of course in moving from the representative of x(t) to that of [x(t)]2 that Heisenberg
discovers the famous multiplication rule.
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this paper,26 Heisenberg seems to see no need to give physical meaning or an
empirical interpretation to this new mathematical characterization of motion
beyond constructing it in analogy with classical mechanics. The only challenge
to the physical significance of his new quantum theoretical quantities Heisenberg
seems to be willing to countenance is that the individual phases are complex. As
soon as that threat is (mathematically) removed, Heisenberg moves on, despite
the fact that “a geometrical interpretation” of the newly devised phase rela-
tions is not possible. If Heisenberg had thought that the problem with position
and period of revolution of the electron in Bohr’s model concerned the physical
meaning of these terms, he should have been much more worried about the fact
that his own reinterpretation of motion lacks a geometrical interpretation. It
seems natural to conclude from this that empirical or physical meaning was not
the concern of Heisenberg’s Umdeutung.
What persuaded him and others that these representatives made sense phys-
ically was that they allowed the formulation of equations of motion for simple
systems (in Heisenberg’s paper the one-dimensional anharmonic oscillator) by
replacing the classical kinematic quantities with the quantum theoretical repre-
sentatives developed in the earlier parts of the paper. At least for simple systems
Heisenberg could show that energy would be conserved under quantum condi-
tions. Heisenberg had thereby succeeded in giving a mathematical description
of the ‘motion’ of electrons in atoms. Recall that Einstein started from such a
mathematical description, demanded an assignment of physical meaning, and
proceeded to provide it by developing his famous thought experiments. From a
positivistic perspective, then, Heisenberg’s redefinition remains incomplete.
Heisenberg’s 1927 paper on the Uncertainty Relations, by contrast, seems to
aim to close the gap. While a geometrical interpretation of the mathematical
descriptions provided by quantum mechanics was still out of reach, Heisenberg
there offers an experimental illustration27 of the uncertainty relations, which
are a consequence of the multiplication rule introduced in 1925. In a sense,28
then, Heisenberg’s 1927 paper completes the project begun in 1925.
The absence of thought experiments and operationalizations of the newly
introduced quantum mechanical motion strongly suggests that reading the op-
erationalism of the later paper into the earlier one would be a mistake. Heisen-
berg’s concern in 1925 is to come up with a mathematical description of electron
motion in atoms, not to give physical meaning to the fledgling quantum mechan-
ics. Accordingly we should not feel bound by later operationalist tendencies in
26As one reviewer helpfully points out, Heisenberg did worry about the question of how
to interpret the newly found quantum mechanical expressions in his correspondence of the
same year (e.g. Heisenberg to Pauli, 24th June 1925 [Pauli, 1979, 228]). It seems to me
that this strengthens the idea that the Umdeutung paper is concerned with a different kind
of reinterpretation, since Heisenberg himself does not seem to think it provides a sufficient
response to the question of empirical meaning.
27This reading of the famous gamma ray thought experiment has been defended by Kristian
Camilleri [2009].
28In the 1927 paper Heisenberg must be seen as pursuing multiple goals at once, which
accounts for the often noted ambiguities and near-contradictions in that paper, see [Beller,
1999] for discussion.
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Heisenberg’s writing to interpret observability in his 1925 paper along positivis-
tic lines. Is there an alternative way of understanding Heisenberg’s argument?
6 Observability and causally idle wheels
For clues on how to understand observability, let’s focus on the role observability
seems to have played in Heisenberg’s paper. As I have already pointed out in
section one, the role of observability was to justify the need for a reinterpretation
of kinematics. Heisenberg seems to have seen a very close connection between
what is observable and what is real, and this connection was plausibly the result
of his exposure to the discussions in Go¨ttingen:
When one spoke about special relativity, people always said, “Well,
there was this very famous point of Einstein that one should only
speak about those things which one can observe, that actually the
time entering in the Lorentz transformation was the real time.” And
in some way that was an essential turn which Einstein had given to
the Lorentz idea. Lorentz had the right formulas, but he thought
that was the apparent time. Einstein said, however, “There is no
apparent and no real time; there is just one real time, and that is
what you call the apparent time.” So this turning of the picture by
saying the real things are those which you observe and everything
else is nothing was in the minds of the Go¨ttingen people. [Kuhn
et al., 1967, Session 5, 18]
This connection between what is real and what is observable can easily be read
along positivistic lines. Yet, as we have seen above, Heisenberg’s redefinition
procedure is radically different from Einstein’s, so even if he mistakenly thought
that unobservability permitted the empirical redefinition of terms, this would
still not explain his procedure in 1925. For Heisenberg, the unobservability of
position and period of the electron inside the atom justifies the mathematical
reinterpretation of the motion of electrons. What Heisenberg needs is a reason
to ‘kill completely’ the concept of an electron orbit, and for that he needs a
reason to think that the quantities associated with electron orbits do not exist.
Can such a reason be given on Heisenberg’s behalf, even if he himself failed
to do so? I suggest that Heisenberg’s dissatisfaction with electron orbits and
their associated quantities is justified ultimately by the causal inefficacy of those
quantities in Bohr’s atomic theory.
Since in Bohr’s model the rotational frequencies of electron orbits did not
correspond to the frequencies of the emitted light, the source of the radiation
and its properties (wavelength, intensity, polarization and phases) remained
obscure. Bohr’s division between classical mechanics, which was supposed to
describe the motion of the electron in the atom, and a quantized electrody-
namics, meant that any hope for a mechanical explanation of the features of
the emitted radiation must be give up. This is perhaps why Heisenberg links
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unobservability to “Unanschaulichkeit” in the introduction to his paper.29
On Bohr’s model, not only was there no mechanism to explain the proper-
ties of the emitted light, since light was emitted (or absorbed) in non-classical
quantum jumps, there was not even hope to restore anything akin to a mechan-
ical explanation, because Bohr had severed the connection between classical
mechanics and quantum theory in order to save the stability of electron orbits.
The only solution Heisenberg saw to restore at least the hope for a mechanical
explanation was to abandon the concept of electron orbits, but more specifically,
to reject the connection between orbits and mechanics. The new mechanics had
to be created using the properties of the emitted radiation, not the properties
of the alleged orbits. If a mechanics could be “fabricated” (Heisenberg to Pauli
June 21 1925 [Pauli, 1979, 221]) which used only features of the emitted ra-
diation, a new very tight connection between electrodynamics and the novel
‘quantum mechanics’ would have been forged.
Just like Einstein put Lorentz’s theory on its head by replacing ‘real’ time by
‘apparent’ time, Heisenberg put Bohr’s theory on its head by replacing orbital
frequencies by emitted frequencies, that is, by redefining kinematic concepts
by means of electrodynamic ones, which had already been subjected to quan-
tum considerations. This also provides a clue to why Heisenberg’s treatment
provided the foundations of quantum mechanics: he chose the part of Bohr’s
theory that had been given a quantum treatment as the basis of the mechanics to
follow. What would become a key feature of quantum physics, namely the mul-
tiplication rule, results from the dependence of quantum mechanical quantities
on two stationary states, a feature which could first be seen in the frequencies of
the emitted light. Heisenberg was successful because he picked those quantities
which were already ‘quantized’ as the basis for his new mechanics, not because
those quantities were observable.
If my reconstruction is correct, the reason Heisenberg rejected electron orbits
and their associated quantities was that Bohr’s theory rendered them inevitably
causally inefficacious. Such principled causal inefficacy is a problem for a theory,
since it both leaves something causally unexplained, and it introduces causally
idle wheels, which seem unconnected and unconnectable to any other parts of
the theory through dynamical laws. Orbits in Bohr’s theory were especially
weird, since they were themselves supposed to be stationary (electron motion
on those orbits notwithstanding) and yet they were needed in the explanation of
line spectra by providing the starting and endpoints of electron ‘jumps’. Orbits
thereby had to be understood as physically significant for the explanation of line
29“It is well known that the formal rules which are used in quantum theory for calculating
observable quantities such as the energy of the hydrogen atom may be seriously criticized
on the grounds that they contain, as basic element, relationships between quantities that are
apparently unobservable in principle, e.g., position and period of the revolution of the elec-
tron.Thus these rules evidently lack an intuitive [anschauliche] physical foundation, unless one
still holds out hope that these hitherto unobservable quantities might become experimentally
accessible later on.” [Heisenberg, 1925, 879; my translation and emphasis] Since on Bohr’s
model electron motion was geometrically represented (as an orbit), Heisenberg’s complaint is
puzzling, unless we take it to be a complaint about the inevitable absence of a fully mechanical
model.
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spectra, yet the kinematic quantities associated with them had to be understood
as causally inefficacious. By rejecting electron orbits, Heisenberg had put his
finger right on the central paradox in Bohr’s model.
One might worry that breaking one causal link, namely that between orbital
electron motion and radiation, does not rule out the possibility of other causal
links being discovered. So in what sense does the ‘no causally idle wheels’
principle fare better than the original observability principle?
Given the specific role of electron orbits in Bohr’s model, Heisenberg would
have had good reason to believe that no such as of yet unknown causal links
will emerge. By insisting that the energy of each orbit must be stable, Bohr had
built into his model assumptions which made it difficult to see how the motion
of electrons on orbits should have any causal effects whatsoever. Energy transfer
is arguably a necessary condition for physical causation,30 and as long as the
electrons are traveling on Bohr’s orbits, the energy is by stipulation stable. Since
this is built into the very basis of Bohr’s model, it makes sense to think that
on Bohr’s theory the kinematic quantities of electron orbits must be causally
inefficacious.
Moreover, since any theory which does not assume orbits to be stationary
leads to unstable atoms, Heisenberg would seem to be justified in thinking that
electron orbits are causally inefficatious in principle: they cannot consistently
be conceptualized in any other way. Perhaps this is how we should understand
his letter to Pauli from June 21st 1925, where he writes: “If something like
mechanics were to hold, it would be inconceivable how there could be atoms;
instead what holds is a different [kind of mechanics], a ‘quantum mechanics’,
and one should only be surprised that the hydrogen atom happens to agree with
something classical with respect to the energy constant.”31
To think of the motion of the electron inside the atom as an observable quan-
tity it had to be divorced from the geometrical representation of that motion,
because it was the electrodynamic quantities which were associated with energy
transfer, not the kinematical ones attributed to ‘classical’ electron motion. But
if that is the real reason for rejecting electron orbits, why did Heisenberg not
say so?
While it is true that Heisenberg does not make any reference to causal inef-
ficacy in the paper itself, his letter to Pauli where he first articulates his basic
principle can actually be read as making a claim about causal relevance. “The
principle is this: Only relationships between quantities in principle controllable
may occur in the calculations for any kind of quantities like energy, frequency
and so forth.”32 It is very plausible to link this to the observability principle,
which occurs in the paper, but it is interesting that Heisenberg here refers to the
30See Dowe [2000] for a recent philosophical treatment of that idea.
31“Wenn so etwas, wie die Mechanik, ga¨lte, wu¨rd man nie verstehen ko¨nnen, daß es Atome
gibt; es gilt eben eine andere, eine ‘Quantenmechanik’, und man muß sich nur dru¨ber wun-
dern, daß das Wasserstoffatom zufa¨llig hinsichtlich der Energiekonstante mit etwas klassischem
u¨bereinstimmt” [Pauli, 1979, 219], my translation.
32The German reads: “Grundsatz ist: Bei der Berechnung von irgendwelchen Gro¨ßen, als
Energie, Frequenz u.s.w. du¨rfen nur Beziehungen zwischen prinzipiell kontrollierbaren Gro¨ßen
vorkommen” [Pauli, 1979, 227; my translation].
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ability to control such quantities. For experimental control has recently [Wood-
ward, 2003] been linked to an understanding of causation frequently found in
the sciences. Perhaps Heisenberg’s unease about electron orbits results not from
their unobservability, but their causal inefficacy and the resulting impossibility
to design experiments in which it is possible to manipulate them.
Part of the historical reason why Heisenberg ultimately chose observability
over controllability as his guiding principle might be that Heisenberg was in fact
too deeply steeped in the discussions at Go¨ttingen, which focused on observ-
ability. Since there is a connection between causal inefficacy and observability,
this might not have seemed to matter. A quantity which is causally ineffica-
cious in principle is thereby also unobservable in principle, since in order to be
observable, whether in the sense of being measurable or in the sense of being
perceptible, a quantity has to be causally active. Perception and measurement
are themselves causal processes, in which causally idle wheels by assumption
cannot participate. In this sense the quantities associated with electron orbits
on Bohr’s atomic model were indeed unobservable.
Being a causally idle wheel entails being unobservable, but not vice versa,
however. If Heisenberg arrived at his conclusion that electron orbits are suspi-
cious and possibly unreal on the basis of their causal inefficacy, then it seems
he should have employed a stronger, and overall more plausible principle for
concluding that electron orbits are unreal than the observability principle. In
that case his connection with the more positivistically inclined Go¨ttingen school
of thought inadvertently weakened his argument. Heisenberg had identified the
suspect feature—being causally idle—but used the wrong principle to defend it.
Saying that something is unobservable or unmeasurable always makes reference
to our sensory, technical, and theoretical abilities. Saying that something is
causally inefficacious, however, has no such anthropomorphic restriction.
Does that mean the observability principle was ad hoc after all? To claim
that the observability principle is ad hoc suggests to me that the principle can
be dispensed with without any loss to the argumentative structure of the paper.
That, I believe, is not correct, since Heisenberg needs an argument to support
the claim that there is something fundamentally wrong with the kinematics of
atoms as understood by Bohr, and that role cannot be played by the corre-
spondence principle alone. There is nonetheless something to that particular
complaint about observability: Heisenberg’s dissatisfaction with electron orbits
probably was not due to their unobservability alone, and the observability prin-
ciple does not suffice to make Heisenberg’s case in the paper. Because of the
connection between causal inefficacy and unobservability, however, we might
understand Heisenberg’s appeal to observability as his, ultimately inadequate,
attempt to articulate his deeper suspicion against electron orbits.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that Heisenberg’s observability principle should not be understood
along positivistic or empiricist lines. Such an interpretation does not yield a
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satisfactory argument for Heisenberg’s purposes in his 1925 paper. Instead,
looking more closely at the alleged analogy with Einstein’s argument against
absolute simultaneity, I suggested that Heisenberg’s observability principle is a
way of framing his dissatisfaction with a fundamental aspect of Bohr’s atomic
model: the causal inefficacy of the electron orbits. Since causal inefficacy of a
quantity entails its unobservability, Heisenberg’s claim that position and period
of revolution in the atom are unobservable in principle is justified.
This should not lead us to think that Heisenberg was committed to the idea
that the terms ‘electron orbit’ and ‘period of revolution’ were meaningless. To
say so seems implausible both because we do seem to have an understanding
of them in terms of classical kinematic concepts and because we can in fact
imagine measurement procedures for them. Fortunately the connection with
meaning (or meaninglessness) is not needed for the purposes of Heisenberg’s
argument. Causally idle wheels are a disadvantage in a physical theory, even if
we understand the terms which purport to refer to them. Moreover, the details
of Heisenberg’s reinterpretation show, that he is not concerned with physical
meaning in the sense demanded by Pauli and Einstein. Accordingly we can both
understand and defend Heisenberg’s argument without reference to positivistic
theories of meaning.
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